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Abstract 
 
To date, the common rhetoric and the assumptions on the performance of faith-based 
organizations, ironically, appear to be faith-based, rather than empirically-supported:  there is 
still a paucity of research evaluating the effectiveness of FBOs that uses sufficiently rigorous 
research methods and multiple measures of organizational performance.  This study seeks to 
inform the debate on the relative effectiveness of FBOs by comparing religiously-affiliated and 
secular nonprofit nursing homes using two distinct but complementary measures of 
organizational performance:  service quality and access for impoverished clients.  Using 
nationally representative panel data on 11, 877 church-affiliated and secular nonprofit nursing 
home facilities, this study examines the effect of ownership with several regression models.  
Overall, our findings fail to confirm the assumption that FBOs perform better than secular 
nonprofit organizations in the context of nursing home industry.  Isomorphic pressures and 
commercialization trends within the nursing home industry are discussed to help explain these 
findings. 
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Introduction 
“When we have Federal monies, people should be allowed to access that money without having to lose 
their mission or change their mission.  We need to know that in our society, faith can move people in 
ways that Government can't.[...]Government can write checks, but it can't put hope in people's hearts or a 
sense of purpose in people's lives.  That is done by people who have heard a call and who act on faith and 
are willing to share that faith.”   
George W. Bush, April 11, 2002 
 
Reflected in George W. Bush’s remarks on the Charity, Aid, and Recovery Act of 2002, 
there has been growing interest in expanding the role that faith-based organizations (FBOs) play 
in the social welfare system.  Involvement of faith-based organizations in the delivery of social 
services in the United States has a long history.  Since the approval of the 1967 amendment of 
the Social Security Act, FBOs providing health and human services along with other nonprofit 
and forprofit social service organizations have become increasingly reliant on public funds. 
More recently, public funding of FBOs gained national prominence with the passage of 
several congressional and presidential initiatives designed to encourage divestment and 
delegation of social services to faith-based providers through contracts.  Some of the most 
noteworthy efforts include the Charitable Choice provision of the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Act of 1996 and the establishment of the Offices of Faith-Based Initiatives.  
Premised on the assumption that FBOs deliver services more effectively than their secular 
counterparts (Kennedy & Bielefeld, 2002), Charitable Choice prohibits states from 
discriminating against “pervasively sectarian” organizations when contracting for public 
services.  In addition, it allows FBOs to maintain hiring practices based on their religious beliefs 
and have religious symbols in sites where services are being delivered.  Building on the 
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Charitable Choice provision, Offices of Faith-Based Initiatives were established in 2001 in five 
federal government agencies in order to promote the involvement of faith-based organizations.   
A key question for policymakers debating an expanded role of FBOs in the social welfare 
delivery system is whether they actually provide better services than their secular counterparts.  
To date, the common rhetoric and assumptions on the performance of faith-based organizations, 
ironically, appear to be faith-based, rather than empirically-supported:  there is still a paucity of 
research evaluating the effectiveness of FBOs that uses sufficiently rigorous research methods 
and multiple measures of organizational performance (Johnson, 2006).   
This study seeks to inform the debate on the relative effectiveness of FBOs by comparing 
religiously-affiliated and secular nonprofit nursing homes using two distinct but complementary 
measures of organizational performance:  service quality and access to services for impoverished 
clients.  This research will help test the proposition that the increased reliance on FBOs, 
encouraged by Charitable Choice and other national initiatives, will improve or, at the very least, 
not undermine the performance of the social welfare system.  This study has important 
methodological advantages over much of the limited research that compares the performance of 
FBOs and secular organizations.  The existing body of research typically focuses on specific 
states or communities as well as often uses cross-sectional data only and sometimes conducts just 
bivariate analysis.  Based on panel data from a large national sample of nonprofit providers, our 
analysis allows us to observe the change in two theoretically distinct outcomes and control for 
the time, location and provider-related fixed effects.  Furthermore, we utilize five different 
regression methods for estimating the proposed theoretical model to address the potential 
problems associated with either the panel data or the system of equations comprising the 
theoretical model.   
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Comparing the Performance of FBOs and Secular Nonprofits 
While recently there has been considerable scholarly interest in FBOs, few studies 
compare the performance of FBOs and secular organizations (Kennedy & Bielefeld, 2006; 
McCarthy & Castelli, 1998; Wuthnow, Hackett, & Hsu, 2004). i  This reflects the dearth of 
research on the effectiveness of social welfare services in general and may be attributable to the 
difficulty associated with measuring these services (Fischer, 2004).  Organizational theorists 
have examined the issue of performance from a variety of perspectives, particularly by focusing 
on goal attainment (Etzioni, 1964; Price, 1972; Miles, 1981), internal organizational 
characteristics (Likert, 1967; Bennis, 1966), the ability to satisfy internal and external 
constituencies (Miles, 1981), and the ability to acquire scarce environmental resources (Seashore 
and Yuchtman, 1967).  Despite the diversity of perspectives, one area of growing consensus is 
that organizational performance is a complex, multi-dimensional concept (Boyne, Meier, 
O’Toole, & Walker, 2005; Brewer & Coleman, 2001; Boschken, 1992, 1994; Cameron, 1978, 
1981, 1982; Quinn & Rohrbaugh, 1981, 1983; Rojas, 2000; Selden & Sowa, 2004).   
Reflecting this complexity, this study focuses on two performance measures reflecting 
two core goals of many nonprofit organizations:  the provision of high quality services that are 
accessible regardless of an individual’s ability to pay (Robbins, 1987).  The latter aspect of 
organizational performance has received relatively little attention as an outcome measure.  
However, it is particularly intriguing in the context of FBOs in light of the assumptions voiced 
by President Bush about their “purpose-driven” activities that “put hope in people’s hearts.” 
Empirical studies offering evidence on the relative service quality of FBOs show mixed 
results.  A few studies specifically focus on differences in service quality within the nursing 
home sector.  In Ragan (2004), church-affiliated nursing homes have approximately 6% fewer 
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inspection deficiencies and 23% fewer complaint deficiencies compared to other nonprofit 
nursing homes.  Results from Weisbrod and Schlesinger (1986) also suggest FBOs provide 
higher quality services than secular nonprofit organizations.  They report that while there is no 
significant difference between the number of violations in church-owned and forprofit nursing 
homes, secular nonprofit nursing homes have significantly more violations than forprofit homes.  
On the other hand, Knox, Blankmeyer, and Stutzman (2006) find there is no difference in the 
quality of care provided by private secular nonprofit nursing homes, religiously affiliated nursing 
homes, and public nursing homes.   
Research that examines differences in service quality in sectors other than the nursing 
home industry also has conflicting results.  Kennedy and Bielefeld (2006) present empirical 
evidence suggesting that secular providers may outperform faith-based providers.  According to 
their study, secular job training providers are more likely to place their clients in full-time 
positions and in positions that offer health benefits compared to faith-based providers.  In 
contrast, Reingold, Pirog, and Brady (2007) fail to find any significant difference between faith-
based and non-religious social service organizations in agency self-ratings of organizational 
performance.  
Other studies report mixed findings.  Desmond and Maddux (1981) find that the 
abstinence rates for heroin addicts in programs classified as "religious" are much higher than the 
rates for conventional treatments or correctional interventions.  However, the abstinence rate for 
a methadone treatment program which also had a religious component but was not classified as 
“religious” by the researchers is no higher than the abstinence rate for the methadone treatment 
programs without a religious component.  Monsma and Soper (2003) focus on five different 
types of organizations delivering welfare-to-work services – public, forprofit, nonprofit secular, 
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faith-based segmented, and faith-based integrated – and find no evidence that one type of 
program is more effective than others.  Each program type performs well on some measures of 
effectiveness and more poorly on others.  Lastly, Wuthnow, Hackett, and Hsu (2004) find that 
there is a positive relationship between client ratings of organizational effectiveness and clients 
having received assistance from congregations.  On the other hand, they find no relationship 
between client ratings and clients having received assistance from either nonsectarian 
organizations or faith-based organizations other than congregations. 
The research comparing accessibility of faith-based and secular nonprofits is even more 
limited than the research on service quality.  In a study of emergency food providers in Detroit, 
Eisinger (2002) approaches accessibility in terms of organizational ability to serve all eligible 
clients and compares this outcome across FBOs and secular nonprofits.  He reports that, after 
controlling for organizational capacity and size, faith-based organizations are more likely to 
never turn away eligible clients compared to their secular counterparts.   
Very few studies directly compare service accessibility for impoverished clients in faith-
based and secular nonprofits, a measure more closely related to the analysis of this paper.  Using 
cross-sectional data from Indiana's randomized welfare reform experiment, Reingold et al. 
(2007) conclude that the most disadvantaged welfare clients are more likely to receive assistance 
from faith-based organizations than from non-religious organizations.  Clients of FBOs are more 
likely to report having been hungry, been homeless, and experienced another form of absolute 
deprivation.  In contrast, Wuthnow et al. (2004) report mixed findings on access based on several 
regression models examining the relationship between various client characteristics and having 
received assistance from different types of service organizations.  They find there is not a 
significant relationship between income and having received assistance from religious 
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congregations.  On the other hand, they report income is negatively related to both receiving 
assistance from faith-based service organizations other than congregations and receiving 
assistance from secular service organizations.  However, it is unclear whether there is a 
significant difference in the poor’s access to FBOs and their secular counterparts in this study 
because there is no joint test comparing client income and access to faith-based and secular 
service organizations.   
In addition to being quite limited, the literature on the comparative performance of FBOs 
and secular nonprofit organizations has a variety of methodological limitations.  Many studies 
are based on cross-sectional data (Eisinger, 2003; Knox et al., 2006; Ragan, 2004; Reingold et 
al., 2007; Weisbrod & Schlesinger, 1986; Wuthnow et al., 2004).   Most focus on specific states 
or communities (for the sole exception see Ragan, 2004) and hence may have limited 
generalizability.  Finally, some of the empirical evidence relating to service quality is based on 
bivariate analysis only (Desmond & Maddux, 1981; Monsma & Soper, 2003; Ragan, 2004; 
Reingold et al, 2007).  
Using panel data from a large national sample of nonprofit nursing homes, our research 
attempts to address many of the methodological limitations of past studies.  A substantial and 
growing proportion of nursing homes are nonprofit (Gabrel, 2000; Schlesinger and Gray, 2006).  
Moreover, there is a general consensus within the nursing home literature that nonprofit 
ownership is positively associated with service quality (Amirkhanyan, Kim, & Lambright, 2008; 
Davis, 1993; Harrington, Zimmerman, Karon, Robinson, & Beutel, 2000; Lemke & Moos, 1989; 
O’Neill, Harrington, Kitchner, & Saliba, 2003; Riportella-Muller & Slesinger, 1982; Schlesinger 
& Gray. 2006; Steffen & Nystrom, 1997).  The nursing home industry provides an interesting 
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setting for investigating whether strong performance in this sector in terms of service quality is 
uniform or varies across religiously-affiliated and secular nonprofit providers. 
To date, no single comprehensive theoretical framework has been proposed to explain the 
differences between faith-based and secular nonprofit organizations.  However, several 
propositions and rival hypotheses may help guide this inquiry.  Graddy & Ye (2006) argue that 
FBOs may be more effective because their reliance on faith results in FBOs using different 
service delivery methods or the same service delivery method but with a different intensity 
compared to their secular counterparts.  Etindi (as cited in Graddy & Ye, 2006) asserts that FBOs 
may be more likely to make a long-term commitment to clients, rely on one-to-one relationships, 
and provide individualized care.ii  Specific to the long-term care industry, managers, employees 
and residents in religiously affiliated nursing homes may be more likely to have similar religious 
beliefs and have shared values about quality of life issues and end-of-life decisions.  The closer 
fit between client needs and organizational offerings may enhance service quality in these 
facilities.  On the other hand, the practice of some FBOs requiring employees to have specific 
religious beliefs may limit their opportunity to hire a qualified workforce (Ebaugh et al., 2003).  
In addition, FBOs’ heavy reliance on volunteers (Alexander, 1999; Ebaugh et al., 2003; Printz, 
1998; Twombly, 2002) may result in higher staff turnover and a lack of professionalism and 
expertise.  Both of these human resource practices have the potential to negatively impact service 
quality.   
Similarly, conflicting propositions can be made about the effect of faith-based status on 
service accessibility for impoverished clients.  Organized religion often stresses compassion, and 
hence FBOs may be more likely to admit nursing home clients, albeit clients of a particular 
religion, irrespective of a client’s ability to pay.  Also compared to other nonprofit organizations, 
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religious organizations receive a higher share of private donations from individuals, foundations 
and corporate donors (The New Nonprofit Almanac & Desk Reference 2002).  As a result, faith-
based nursing homes are more likely to be supported by private donations, and thus have the 
financial capacity to admit low-income clients.  On the other hand, FBOs may be more likely to 
create personalized environments that attract wealthier clients who are willing to pay for services 
in such institutions, and hence they will provide less access to the poor.  There is also some 
evidence that in the nursing home industry secular nonprofit facilities are more efficient than 
religiously-affiliated ones (Knox et al, 2006).iii  As a result, religiously-affiliated nursing homes 
may have to place more emphasis on finding wealthier clients in order to generate greater 
revenues to compensate for the lack of operational efficiency.  The subsequent analysis explores 
these conflicting propositions about the relative performance of FBOs and their secular 
counterparts. 
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Methods 
Data.  In this study, we use the Online Survey, Certification and Reporting (“SNF 
OSCAR 044”) data set, and the sixteen Nursing Home Compare (NHC) quarterly files pertaining 
to the period between March 2000 and December 2003.iv  Both OSCAR and NHS are nursing 
home level panel data described in Appendix A.  They contain information on a facility’s federal 
provider number, name, and address as well as detailed information on ownership status, 
occupancy, capacity, residents by source of payment, chain affiliation, staffing, and regulatory 
quality violations identified by the inspectors in the review process.  Three criteria are used to 
narrow down the sample:  (a) remaining within the same nonprofit ownership category 
(nonprofit church, nonprofit corporation, or nonprofit other) across all waves; and (b) continuous 
operation between the earliest (3/1/2000) and the latest (12/2/2003) waves of NHC data.  Our 
sample, consequently, is an unbalanced panel data set which includes 3,167 nonprofit nursing 
facilities and 11,877 inspection records (i.e., three or four survey records) pertaining to these 
facilities.  
Dependent Variables.  OSCAR includes unique information on regulatory violations 
with respect to 188 performance guidelines within seventeen broad regulatory areas.v  Due to an 
extensive review and appeal process, deficiencies data are regarded as an accurate and reliable 
data source on nursing home performance (Harrington et al., 2000).  The 188 indicators of 
regulatory violations in the OSCAR data are nominal variables assigned the value of 1 when a 
violation pertaining to a specific regulation is identified and the value of 0 when inspectors find 
no violation.  Several measures of quality have been identified and used in the nursing home care 
literature, including the primary measure used in this study:  the sum of all 188 indicators 
reflecting the total number of violations identified by state inspectors during one specific visit 
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(Harrington et al., 2000).  Higher values of this variable reflect more violations, while lower 
values indicate better quality.vi   
By using a measure of quality reflecting regulatory violations, we are focusing on a 
tangible and relatively more objective performance measure which is identified by independent 
observers.  Our measure may or may not be correlated with self-reported measures of client 
satisfaction or client quality of life.  Some religious institutions may be successful at creating a 
positive perception among their clients particularly due to congruent organizational and 
individual religious values, but may be ineffective at addressing issues like bed sores and 
infection, safety, adequacy of medications and nutrition.  The nursing care field has long been 
viewed as a complex service area where clients cannot adequately judge services quality 
(Hansmann, 1996).  While the impact of church-affiliation on client perceptions is interesting to 
consider, in this paper we explore whether faith-based status is associated with more measurable 
and objectively verifiable structures, processes and outcomes, rather than perceptions reported by 
the clients. 
The second outcome of interest is a facility’s propensity to admit and provide care to the 
recipients of the Medicaid program which finances the chronic care of low-income individuals.  
For nursing homes, such clients are generally less desirable compared to those whose care is 
covered by Medicare,vii private long term care insurance or out of pocket payments.  Hence, 
nursing homes commonly try to avoid admitting Medicaid recipients in fear of becoming 
“resource poor” due to the low reimbursement-to-cost ratio for Medicaid residents (Castle 2006, 
64; The Lewin Group, 2002).  Our first measure of access – the proportion of Medicaid 
recipients in a facility – is obtained by dividing the number of Medicaid-funded residents by the 
total number of residents in a facility.  Our second measure reflects a facility’s share of the 
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county-wide Medicaid population residing in local nursing homes, obtained by dividing the 
number of Medicaid-funded residents in a facility by the total number of Medicaid-funded 
nursing home residents in the county.  
Independent Variables.  As the central independent variable in our analysis, we created a 
dummy variable to indicate whether a facility is church-related or not.viii  Nursing home staff is 
responsible for classifying their facility’s ownership status.  In our correspondence with the 
Director of the CMS division of Nursing Homes, he indicated that “church-related” status in the 
NHC data is usually interpreted to mean “under the management of a church organization.”ix  
However, it is left up to the nursing homes to define what that means.  Similar to our research, 
other studies on faith-based nonprofits (Kearns, Park, & Yankoski, 2005; Reingold, Pirog, & 
Brady, 2007) have used measures of church-based ownership that rely on agency self-
identificationx. 
While the primary independent variable of interest is ownership status, we controlled for 
several other factors that may also influence organizational performance.  Internal organizational 
factors include size (Boyne, 2003; Moynihan & Pandey 2005), network participation (Boyne 
2003; Harrington, Woolhandler, Mullan, Carrillo, & Himmelstein, 2001; O'Neill et al., 2003; 
Rainey & Steinbauer 1999), human and monetary resources (Boyne, 2003; Brewer & Selden, 
2000), and the presence of organized resident groups.  In addition, we control for a variety of 
environmental factors based on past research including competition (Buchanan & Tullock, 1962; 
Milward & Provan, 2000; Ostrom, 1973; Ostrom, 1990,Romzek & Johnston, 2005; Shea, 1998; 
Tiebout, 1954), population religiosity (Perry 1997, 2000), social capital (Putnam, 1993), 
community demographics, political culture, voting patterns, and regulation (Arrow, 1984; 
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Boyne, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Control variables included in the 
regressions are described in Table 1. 
[table 1 here] 
Regression Models. Due to the fact that two separate organizational outcomes are 
examined in this study, a system of two regression equations was used.  Equation 1 (“Quality” 
model) and equation 2 (“Access” model) employ dependent variables measuring quality and 
access, respectively.  Each regression includes an ownership dummy, and other control variables. 
A measure of access is controlled for in equation 1, and a measure of quality is controlled for in 
the equation 2.  Fixed time effects are addressed by including year dummies.   
 “Quality” Model: 
Q =0 + 1FB +2A + 3X1 + 4Y2000 +5Y2001 +6Y2002 +7Y2003 + ε1 
“Access” Model: 
A =0 +  1FB+ 2Q + 3X2 + 4Y2000 +5Y2001 +6Y2002 +7Y2003 + ε2 
where Q = quality measure, A = access for Medicaid clients, FB = faith-based ownership dummy, N = nonprofit 
ownership dummy, X1 = set of control variables, X2 = set of control variables, y2000~y2003 =year dummies.  
 
In addition to running an OLS with fixed time effects, we tried to improve the efficiency 
of the estimator by addressing some of the problems associated with the data.  Since we use the 
same data and largely overlapping sets of independent variables for estimating quality and access 
models, the errors of two equations may be correlated.  The latter violates the homoskedastisity 
assumption of the OLS model.  To correct this problem, we used the Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) in order to estimate the two equations jointly (Griffiths, Hill, & Judge, 1993).  
Our analysis is based on a system of equations in which the dependent variable in the 
“Quality” model is used as an independent variable in the “Access” model, and vice versa.  As a 
result, measures of quality and access are endogenous, rather than exogenous, and become 
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correlated with the error terms producing biased and inconsistent estimates (Gujarati, 1995).  To 
control the reciprocal relationships between quality and access, we used Two Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS) estimation (Griffiths, Hill, & Judge, 1993).xi   
Since we are using panel data and have multiple observations on each facility, the OLS 
assumption of independent observations is violated, and using OLS will produce inefficient 
estimates (Gujarati, 1995).  In order to control for facility level fixed effects, we used regressor 
variable method.  This method is often used for making causal inferences with non-experimental 
data and with dependent variables measured at two points (Allison, 1990).  As dependent 
variables, we used quality and access measures pertaining to the latest inspection record, and 
controlled for the “pretest” quality and access measures, as well as independent variables 
pertaining to the earliest survey record for each facility.   
Due to the fact that the total deficiency score has a skewed distribution with positive-only 
values, we also obtained Poisson and Negative Binomial regressions.  In the Poisson regression, 
which was obtained first, the Pearson chi-square and deviance were greater than one and, hence, 
indicated overdispersion (Gardner, Mulvey and Shaw 1995).  Consequently, we opted for the 
Negative Binomial model, which addressed over-dispersion by including a random term for 
unexplained between-subject differences and, as a result, significantly improved the goodness of 
fit statistics.  Hence, we report results for the Negative Binomial regressions, rather than Poisson.  
OLS was used to analyze access in the access model using the regressor variable method.   
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Findings 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for panel data with 11,877 inspection records for 
nonprofit facilities analyzed in this study.  An average facility in the data set has 4.5 regulatory 
violations identified during an inspection.xii  Most of these violations pertain to quality of care 
rather than quality of life and other aspects of performance. Around 50% of residents in 
nonprofit facilities in our sample are covered by Medicaid, and the average facility’s market 
share of all Medicaid recipients in their county is 15%.  Twenty percent of all records pertain to 
church-affiliated nursing homes.  The average number of residents in a facility is 86, with almost 
5 hours of nursing staff hours per resident per day and an 86% occupancy rate.  The vast 
majority of all facilities have organized family-led or resident-led groups.  Only a small minority 
of homes are affiliated with hospitals or are part of a chain.  Facilities in our sample operate in 
very competitive markets (the Herfindahl index is close to 0).  An average of 14% of the 
population in the local counties where the facilities in our sample operate are older than 65.  
Slightly more than half of facilities operate in counties where a majority voted for Bush during 
the 2000 presidential elections.  Facilities also tend to operate in counties with over half of the 
population reporting some attendance of religious services and participation in the census (our 
measure of community social capital).  Most nursing homes are in the states with enacted 
Certificate of Need laws, and facilities in our sample are roughly evenly divided into each of 
Elazar’s (1966) three political culture categories.xiii  
[table 2 here] 
We used six different types of regression methods to ascertain the robustness of our 
findings.  Since the estimation results are largely consistent across methods, we report the 
findings from the OLS estimation (shown in Table 3).  All the other estimation results are 
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reported as Appendices D, E, and F.  In terms of quality, our findings indicate no difference 
between faith-based and secular organizations.   The ownership coefficient for the overall quality 
score (total quality violations) is insignificantxiv.  In addition, there is not a significant interaction 
effect for between faith-based ownership status and the following variables:  size, market 
concentration, and community religiosity.  Hence, faith-based organizations do not appear to be 
any different from their secular nonprofit counterparts in terms of service quality.  Similar to 
previous empirical studies of nursing home quality, our analysis indicates that multiple 
organizational and external environmental factors may influence quality.  Among such factors 
are the proportion of Medicaid recipients, facility size, the presence of organized groups in the 
nursing home, chain affiliation, the proportion of the elderly population in the community, and 
census participation, all of which positively affect the number of violations.   On the other hand, 
factors negatively associated with the number of violations include location in a county where 
the majority voted for George W. Bush in the 2000 election, community religiosity, Certificate 
of Need laws, location in a state with a Individualistic political culture, and total HCBS waiver 
spending.   
[table 3 here] 
Findings pertaining to access to care for Medicaid recipients are more intriguing. When 
examining our first measure of access – the proportion of facility Medicaid recipients– faith-
based status does not appear to matter.  Coefficients for the ownership dummy and all 
interactions are insignificant.  On the other hand, faith-based ownership status is significant 
using our second measure of access.  Faith-based homes’ share of the county-wide Medicaid 
population is lower than the share served by secular homes by 2.4 percentage points (sig. < 0.01).  
We also find that faith-based ownership is positively moderated by size and community 
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religiosity and negatively moderated by market concentration.  In other words, the proportion of 
Medicaid residents being served by faith-based facilities increases relative to the proportion 
being served by secular non-profits as both facility size and county religiosity increase.  In 
contrast, the proportion of Medicaid residents being served by faith-based facilities decreases 
relative to the proportion being served by secular nonprofit facilities as market concentration 
increases.  The control variables negatively associated with access in both OLS models include 
facility staffing, hospital affiliation, census participation, and year dummy variables.  Quality of 
care, facility size, the presence of organized groups in the nursing home, market concentration, 
community religiosity, and facility location in a state with a Moralist or Individualistic political 
culture are, on the other hand, positively associated with having a high Medicaid-recipient 
market share as well as the proportion of facility Medicaid recipients.   
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Discussion 
Our study investigated the effect of faith-based ownership on organizational performance 
in nursing homes.  Our findings are not congruent with the proposition that faith-based 
organizations deliver services more effectively than their secular counterparts.  We find that 
certain organizational and environmental factors, rather than faith based status, significantly 
influence the quality of nursing home services.  The findings of this study are consistent with 
Knox, Blankmeyer, and Stutzman (2006) which indicates that faith-based status does not impact 
service quality in nursing homes.  On the other hand, our findings diverge from Ragan (2004) 
and Weisbrod and Schlesinger (1986) which also focus on nursing homes and suggest a positive 
link between faith-based status and quality.  Differences between this study’s findings and Ragan 
(2004) and Weisbrod and Schelesinger (1986) may be the result of methodological flaws 
pertaining to these earlier studies, including using cross-sectional data, as well as bivariate 
analysis (Ragan 2004) and data from only one state (Weisbrod and Schlesinger 1986).  We also 
fail to find consistent evidence of faith-based status affecting the level of access for 
impoverished, Medicaid-funded residents.  Accessibility of faith-based nursing homes is indeed 
significantly lower in our OLS model examining the effect of faith-based status on the share of 
county-wide Medicaid recipients. Overall, however, our findings fail to confirm the assumption 
that FBOs perform relatively better than secular nonprofit organizations, at least in the case of 
nursing home industry.  
Taking into account the domain of nursing home service, we propose some plausible 
explanations for these findings. On the one hand, church-affiliated nursing homes are different 
from secular nursing homes in terms of their reliance on religious leaders for management, 
consideration of religion when hiring employees, and a relatively lower dependence on 
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government funding (Ebaugh et al., 2003).  On the other hand, the impact of religion may be 
dampened in some service areas because of environmental factors.  In the field of nursing home 
care, faith-based service providers face strong isomorphic pressures from government regulators 
as well as from other service providers.  Pressure from federal and state agencies to comply with 
various regulatory requirements promotes standardization of nursing home service delivery 
mechanisms.  In terms of management and administration, faith-based nursing homes may have 
significantly higher costs than other faith-based nonprofits, due to the need for sophisticated 
billing, accounting, and oversight systems to meet federal standards. 
Further reinforcing these isomorphic pressures, the trend of commercialization appears to 
be more advanced in the nursing home sector than in other areas where faith-based nonprofits are 
key service providers because faith-based nursing homes compete for business with secular 
nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes (James, 2004).xv  Commercial pressure increases the need 
for FBOs to adopt competitors’ management practices, funding mechanisms, and staff skills 
(Alexander, 1999; Salamon, 1997).  Faith-based nursing homes may reconcile the tension 
between the mimetic isomorphic pressure and their faith-based mission by shifting resources 
from service delivery to advancing management and administrative practices (Alexander, 1999).   
As a result, these isomorphic pressures specific to the long term care sector may end up being 
more important than faith-based traits in determining the organizational performance. Hence, the 
difference between FBOs and secular organizations becomes trivial. 
Researchers should generalize this study’s findings with caution.  They may be specific 
to the nursing home care domain where intensive government regulations and strong peer 
influences over management practices and service delivery mechanisms are present.  Future 
studies should test our findings in other fields using advanced statistical techniques, such as 
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panel data analysis and a system of equations incorporating reciprocal relationships between 
different performance measures.  Simple t-tests have serious limitations in describing the full 
picture, unless we control for organizational and market characteristics.  The motivation for 
further research in other fields may, nonetheless, be tempered by a vexing conundrum.  The 
service areas in which data on organizational outcomes is reliable and readily available, such as 
the nursing home industry, are likely to be heavily regulated and may face strong isomorphic 
pressures.  Other, less regulated, areas, such as mental health, alcohol abuse, or homeless 
services, may suffer from the lack of reliable data.  Such areas, we believe, may also be 
inherently more likely to benefit from the unique qualities of FBOs.  Thus, more high-quality 
performance data is needed in sectors with less regulation where the distinctive characteristics of 
FBOs may have a more pronounced impact on service delivery.   
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Appendix A. Data 
The Nursing Home Compare data were provided by Mr. Edward Mortimore, Technical 
Director, Division of Nursing Homes, Center for Medicaid and State Operations.  Sixteen 
quarterly NHC files, distributed by private vendors under the name of “OSCAR”, were merged 
together in order to obtain a panel data on all facilities in the United States.  Each quarterly file 
represents the most recent survey results on all operating Medicaid or Medicare certified nursing 
home care providers in the country. The survey is conducted by a team of nurses, dietitians, 
pharmacists, social workers, physicians, physical therapists, or other professionals which surveys 
each facility roughly once a year. Each NHC quarterly file includes survey results related to the 
most recent state inspection conducted within 9-15 months prior to the release of that quarterly 
file. Each consecutive file includes new information on facilities that were surveyed during the 
past quarter; at the same time facilities that were not inspected during that period will have 
identical information as in the previous NHC file. Our data pertains to the period between March 
2000 and December 2003, and we have about 4 survey records for each facility. The obtained 
panel data set is unbalanced, since the number of inspections varies from facility to facility.  
In this analysis, we restricted the sample to facilities that operated continuously and 
remained in the same category of nonprofit ownership status between 03/2000 and 12/2003 (i.e., 
nonprofit-church, nonprofit-corporation, and nonprofit-other).  With the facility provider number 
being the main identifier in the data set, it is difficult to link facilities over time in cases when 
they change provider numbers. We tried to identify the instances of provider number changes in 
order retain a larger sample. We compared the earliest (N=17103) and the latest (N=16341) 
quarterly files, and identified the zip codes in which a provider number was terminated and at 
least one other number was initiated during our time frame.  Using SAS, we compared the 
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facility names and phone numbers across the terminated and new groups and, in cases of a 
match, concluded that we are dealing with the same facility that changed its federal provider 
number. As additional data cleaning steps, we have eliminated facilities with more residents than 
beds, as well as facilities with no beds and residents. We also deleted all records with missing 
cases on any variable in the regression model. Finally, we have restricted our file to three 
ownership categories: (a) nonprofit church, (b) nonprofit corporation, and (c) nonprofit other. 
Our final sample consistent of 3167 facilities and our final data set included 11877 inspection 
records (i.e., about 4 records pertaining to each facility).  
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Appendix B. Alternative Measures of Quality 
Harrington and colleagues (2000) proposed and evaluated the use of three categories of 
deficiencies which are argued to be conceptually separate and easier to analyze than the 17 
original categories:  (A) Quality of Care deficiencies are represented by the sum of deficiencies 
in the following nine regulatory categories:  resident assessment, quality of care, nursing 
services, dietary services, physician services, specialized rehabilitative services, dental services, 
pharmacy services, and infection control; (B) Quality of Life deficiencies are represented by the 
sum of deficiencies in the areas of resident rights, admission, transfer and discharge rights, 
resident behavior and facility practices, resident quality of life, and physical environment; (C) 
Other regulatory violations are the sum of deficiencies in the categories of administration, 
laboratory, and other.  These categories are also able to reduce some variability resulting from 
individual discretion that surveyors employ in detecting quality problems: “Because surveyors 
have some discretion in the specific individual deficiencies that they apply to quality problems 
that they detect, grouping deficiencies into few broad categories has the advantage of reducing 
some variability inherent in the survey process” (Harrington at al., 2000, p. 279).  Using a 
confirmatory factor analysis, Mullan and Harrington (2001) propose a second alternative 
measure of quality – the sum of 40 OSCAR quality indicators – which is argued to represent a 
“core” set of items that reliably reflects service quality.  The scale represents just 20 percent of 
all items and correlates well with the total deficiencies score.  Finally, Cowles (2002) discusses 
the use of a measure that focuses specifically on deficiencies associated with nursing care.  The 
measure is the sum of 45 out of the188 deficiency indicators pertaining to the activities of the 
nursing staff which always play a central role in any nursing facility.  In sum, three alternative 
measures of quality are used in addition to the total deficiencies score: (1) quality of life, quality 
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of care and other deficiencies, proposed by Harrington and colleagues (2000), (2) a 40-item scale 
proposed by Mullan and Harrington (2001), and (3) a nursing care deficiency score discussed by 
Cowles (2002).  The alternative measures were closely correlated with our main measure of 
quality – total number of deficiencies. The coefficients of correlation were 0.9 (with Cowles’s 
measure, 40-item scale and Harrington’s Quality of Care), 0.8 (with Harrington’s Quality of 
Life), and 0.6 (with Harrington’s Other). We estimated the quality model, using these five 
different quality measures and the results show that the association between ownership and 
quality are consistently congruent with the association found in the model using the total 
deficiency score as the primary measure of quality.  Hence, findings reported in the table pertain 
to the primary measure of quality. 
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Appendix C.  Estimation Results of Using Alternative Quality Measures 
 
Dependent Variables Quality of Care Quality of Life Others 
Regression Models OLS 
Clustering 
errors by 
facility 
OLS 
Clustering 
errors by 
facility 
OLS 
Clustering 
errors by 
facility 
Access             
% of Medicaid Recipients 
in a facility 
0.015*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Faith Based Organization             
Yes 0.260 0.261 0.197 1.197 0.050 0.051 
Facility Level             
Size(Number of residents) 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0002* 0.0002 
Organized resident group 0.418*** 0.418*** 0.082 0.082 -0.007 -0.007 
Staffing per resident -0.002 -0.003 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.002 
Inside a Hospital 0.2159** 0.2159* 0.067 0.067 -0.011 -0.011 
Chain affiliation 0.201*** 0.201** 0.080** 0.080* 0.006 0.006 
County Level             
Market Concentration  
(Herfindahl Index) 0.129 0.130 -0.139 -0.139 -0.091** -0.091* 
% of elderly in the 
population 0.024** 0.024* 0.005 0.005 -0.002 -0.003 
Bush County -0.259*** -0.259** -0.205*** -0.205*** -0.099*** -0.099*** 
Number of Home Health 
Agencies 0.103 0.104 -0.038 -0.039 0.020 0.021 
Religiosity -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0001* -0.0001* 
Social capital (Census 
return rate) 0.018*** 0.018** 0.0003 0.0004 -0.003*** -0.003** 
State Level             
Certificate of Need -0.504*** -0.504*** -0.381*** -0.381*** -0.237*** -0.237*** 
Moralist 0.043 0.044 0.005 0.006 -0.096*** -0.096*** 
Individualist -0.849*** -0.849*** -0.476*** -0.476*** -0.142*** -0.142*** 
Total Waiver Expenditure -0.00001*** -0.00001** -0.000008*** -0.000008** -0.000003*** -0.000003** 
Year Dummies            
 y2000 0.293* 0.293* 0.107 0.107 0.002 0.003 
y2001  0.194 0.194 0.075 0.075 -0.008 -0.008 
y2002  0.114 0.114 0.063 0.063 -0.010 -0.010 
y2003  0.157 0.157 0.022 0.022 -0.002 -0.002 
Interactions             
FaithBased*Size -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0003 
FaithBased*Concentration -0.394 -0.394 0.110 0.111 0.150* 0.150 
FaithBased*Religiosity -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0003 
Intercept 2.068*** 2.068*** 1.839*** 1.839*** 0.880*** 0.880*** 
R2 0.080 0.080 0.077 0.077 0.0427 0.0427 
Note: *** P<0.001; ** P<0.01; * P<0.05;  N= 11,877 The reported effects of the slopes are not standardized.  
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Appendix D.  Quality Model  
(Dependent variable=Total Number of Violations) 
Regression Models 
Clustering 
errors by 
facility 
SUR 2SLS Negative Binomial 
Access       
 % of Medicaid Recipients in a Facility 0.027*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.005*** 
Quality         
Total Number of Violation – – – 0.053*** 
Faith Based Organization        
Yes 0.505 0.459 0.459 -0.059 
Facility Level        
Size(Number of residents) 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.005*** -0.0003 
Organized resident group 0.495** -0.082 -0.055 0.089 
Staffing per resident 0.004 0.028* 0.027 -0.003 
Inside a Hospital 0.274 0.606*** 0.592** -0.045 
Chain affiliation 0.288* 0.277*** 0.286*** 0.062 
County Level         
Market Concentration  (Herfindahl Index) 0.904 -0.649** -0.624 0.114 
% of elderly in the population 0.026 0.033** 0.033* 0.016** 
Bush County -0.564*** -0.589*** -0.588*** -0.086* 
Number of Home Health Agencies 0.088 0.079 0.079 -0.015 
Religiosity -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.0002 
Social capital (Census return rate) 0.015 0.033*** 0.032** -0.0003 
State Level         
Certificate of Need -1.121*** -1.317*** -1.308*** -0.048 
Moralist -0.055 -0.120 -0.117 -0.008 
Individualist -1.470*** -1.480*** -1.478*** -0.309*** 
Total Waiver Expenditure -0.00002** -0.00003*** -0.00003*** 0 
Year Dummies                   
y2000 0.402 0.612** 0.602** – 
y2001 0.262 0.488* 0.477* – 
y2002 0.169 0.391 0.380 – 
y2003 0.178 0.398 0.388 – 
Interactions         
FaithBased*Size -0.002 -0.0015 -0.002 0.0007 
FaithBased*Concentration -0.142 0.004 -0.004 -0.046 
FaithBased*Religiosity -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0001 
Time Difference         
Latest year - Earliest year – – – 0.046 
Intercept 4.790*** 3.107*** 3.180** 0.867*** 
Note: *** P<0.001; ** P<0.01; * P<0.05;  N= 11,877 (3167 for the negative binomial method). The reported 
effects of the slopes are not standardized  
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Appendix E.  Access Model I 
(Dependent Variable = % of Medicaid Recipients in a Facility) 
Regression Models 
Clustering 
errors by 
facility 
SUR 2SLS 
Regressor 
Variable 
Method 
Access 
 % of Medicaid Recipients in a Facility 
 
– 
 
– 
 
– 
 
0.800*** 
Quality         
Total Number of Violation 0.703*** 1.390*** 0.121 0.138** 
Faith Based Organization         
Yes 1.716 0.311 1.054 -0.658 
Facility Level         
Size(Number of residents) 0.077*** 0.071*** 0.083*** 0.009* 
Organized resident group 21.776*** 21.014*** 22.437*** 3.103 
Staffing per resident -0.913*** -0.898*** -0.928*** -0.066 
Inside a Hospital -13.063*** -12.986*** -13.134*** -3.164*** 
Occupancy Rate 0.0004 0.0004 -0.001 0.080*** 
County Level         
Market Concentration (Herfindahl Index) 19.156*** 18.898*** 19.381*** 3.030* 
% of elderly in the population -0.186** -0.201** -0.173* -0.118 
Bush County 2.564*** 2.884*** 2.290** 0.262 
Number of Home Health Agencies -0.266 -0.319 -0.220 0.848 
Poverty Rate 0.892*** 0.858*** 0.919*** 0.302*** 
Religiosity 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.005 -0.002 
Social Capital (Census Return Rate) -0.349*** -0.360*** -0.340*** 0.001 
State Level         
Certificate of Need 9.144*** 9.747*** 8.633*** 0.740 
Moralist 4.120*** 4.046*** 4.177*** 0.734 
Individualist 2.997*** 3.959*** 2.173 1.500* 
Total Waiver Expenditure 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** -0.000002 
Year Dummies     
          y2000 -7.469*** -7.622*** -7.351*** – 
y2001 -7.981*** -8.028*** -7.953*** – 
y2002 -7.710*** -7.694*** -7.725*** – 
y2003 -7.698*** -7.687*** -7.71048 – 
Interactions       
FaithBased*Size -0.006 -0.004 -0.007 0.001 
FaithBased*Concentration -4.548 -4.404 -4.672 -5.993* 
FaithBased*Religiosity -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 0.003 
Time Difference         
Latest year - Earliest year – – – -0.349 
Intercept 24.996*** 21.741*** 27.907** -1.851 
R2 0.424 0.340 0.414 0.823 
Note: *** P<0.001; ** P<0.01; * P<0.05;  N= 11,877 (3167 for the negative binomial method). The reported 
effects of the slopes are not standardized.  
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Appendix F.  Access Model II 
(Dependent Variable = Share of County-wide Medicaid Recipients) 
Regression Models 
Clustering 
errors by 
facility 
SUR 2SLS 
Regressor 
Variable 
Method 
Access     
 Share of county-wide Medicaid Recipients – – – 0.895*** 
Quality         
Total Number of Violation 0.146*** 0.289*** 4.758** -0.031 
Faith Based Organization         
Yes -1.434 -2.520** -5.120* -0.985 
Facility Level         
Size(Number of residents) 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.0004 0.002 
Organized resident group 2.188** 2.031*** -3.042 0.361 
Staffing per resident -0.165*** -0.162*** -0.045 -0.020 
Inside a Hospital -4.399*** -4.385*** -3.836*** -0.979*** 
Occupancy Rate -0.004 -0.002 0.009 0.010 
County Level         
Market Concentration (Herfindahl Index) 93.278*** 93.207*** 91.491*** 8.629 
% of elderly in the population -0.016 -0.017 -0.118 0.005 
Bush County 0.061 0.138 20.230** 0.433 
Number of Home Health Agencies 1.012* 0.997 0.655 0.561** 
Poverty Rate -0.070 -0.070** -0.289** 0.043 
Religiosity 0.004* 0.005*** 0.022*** -0.00002 
Social Capital (Census Return Rate) -0.063 -0.063*** -0.133** -0.019 
State Level         
Certificate of Need -0.705** -0.572* 3.347* -0.191 
Moralist 1.983*** 1.981*** 1.525* -0.186 
Individualist 0.977*** 1.191*** 7.516*** -0.235 
Total Waiver Expenditure -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.00005 -0.00002 
Year Dummies                  
y2000 -1.422*** -1.447** -2.355* – 
y2001 -1.466*** -1.469** -1.691 – 
y2002 -1.658*** -1.647*** -1.535 – 
y2003 -1.267** -1.258** -1.169 – 
Interactions       
FaithBased*Size 0.013 0.013*** 0.023* 0.001 
FaithBased*Concentration -4.931 -4.894*** -3.946 -0.460 
FaithBased*Religiosity 0.004 0.004* 0.008* 0.002 
Time Difference         
Latest year - Earliest year – – – 0.051 
Intercept -1.768 -2.753 -24.845** 0.405 
R2 0.838 0.727 0.482 0.944 
Note: *** P<0.001; ** P<0.01; * P<0.05;  N= 11,877 (3167 for the regressor variable method). The reported 
effects of the slopes are not standardized. 
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Notes
                                                 
i Many scholars have focused on determining what makes an organization “faith-based” (Jeavons, 1997) and 
classifying the different types of faith-based nonprofits (Cnaan et al., 1999; Sider & Unruh, 2004; Smith & Sosin, 
2001).  Other research has examined the characteristics of FBOs including their client base (McCarthy & Castelli, 
1998; Pipes & Ebaugh, 2002), service delivery systems (Campbell, 2002; Graddy & Ye, 2006; Gronbjerg & Clerkin, 
2007, Kearns, Park, & Yankoski, 2005; McCarthy & Castelli, 1998; Pipes & Ebaugh, 2002), human resources 
(Ebaugh, Saltzman, Chafetz, & Daniels, 2003; Netting, O’Connor, Thomas, & Yancey, 2005, Kearns et al., 2005), 
management capacity (Gronbjerg & Clerkin, 2007; Kearns et al., 2005), leadership (Ebaugh at al, 2003) and fiscal 
environment (Burke, Fossett, & Gais, 2004; Ebaugh et al., 2003; Kearns, et al, 2005; Pipes & Ebaugh, 2002; 
Twombly, 2002).  Some of this genre has focused just on the characteristics of FBOs while others have compared 
the characteristics of FBOs and secular nonprofits.  Another area of research has explored the impact of government 
funding on FBOs (Chambre, 2001; Chaves & Tsitsos, 2001; Heimstra, 2002; Monsma, 1996; Smith & Lipsky, 1993; 
Smith & Sosin, 2001; Vanderwoerd, 2004). 
ii There is mixed empirical evidence as to whether these types of service delivery differences actually exist 
(Campbell, 2002; Chaves & Tsitsos, 2001).   
iii Knox et al. (2006) find differences in both the cost and allocational efficiency of secular nonprofit and religiously-
affiliated nursing homes. 
iv The data are collected by state inspectors as a part of the quality assessment and state certification process of 
residential chronic care facilities that receive reimbursement from the Medicare and Medicaid programs. 
v These areas include: (1) resident rights; (2) admission, transfer, and discharge rights; (3) resident behavior and 
facility practices;  (4) resident quality of life;  (5) resident assessment;  (6) quality of care;  (7) nursing services;  (8) 
dietary services;  (9) physician services; (10)  rehabilitation services; (11) dental services;  (12) pharmacy services; 
(13) infection control; (14) physical environment; (15) administration; (16) laboratory; and  (17) other (CMS, n.d.) 
vi Alternative quality measures used for sensitivity analysis are described in Appendix B.   
vii Not being intended for reimbursement of chronic care, the Medicare program only covers a short period of 
institutionalization (approximately 100 days) in a chronic care facility following a period of hospitalization for 
Medicare-eligible clients.  
 30
                                                                                                                                                             
viii OSCAR and NHC data sets assign all facilities to one of the following ownership categories: (1) forprofit 
individual, (2) forprofit partnership, (3) forprofit corporation, (4) nonprofit church, (5) nonprofit corporation, (6) 
nonprofit other, (7) government state, (8) government county, (9) government city, (10), government city/county, 
(11) government hospital district, and (12) government federal.  As mentioned above, our sample is limited to 
nonprofit organizations (i.e., categories 4, 5, and 6).  Organizations assigned to category 4 are classified as a 1 for 
our FBO dummy variable, and organizations assigned to category 5 or 6 are classified as a 0 for our FBO dummy 
variable.   
ix CMS does not provide their staff with any further formal regulatory definitions. 
x There are some limitations associated with our measure of ownership.  The OSCAR/NHC church-related 
ownership category does not capture a facility’s propensity to provide access to religious services to clients.  Even 
secular homes provide regular access to various (often, interdenominational) religious services to their residents.  
Hence, our control groups – facilities that are not identified as church-related – may have some degree of religiosity 
embedded in their activities.  
xi Based on Wu (1973), a Hausman test was performed to determine if any of these models – OLS, 2SLS and SUR – 
should be preferred.  The test results show that either SUR or 2SLS is not preferred to OLS.  Hence, our discussion 
in the findings section will be primarily based on the OLS estimation results, but any discrepancies between the 
estimation methods will be indicated. 
xii While theoretically the total number of violations may range between 0 and 188, the actual values range between 
0 and 48, with 90% of all inspection records having fewer than 10 violations. 
xiii According to Elazar’s (1966) categorization of state political cultures, Moralistic political cultures consider 
government as a legitimate apparatus to promote public welfare, Individualistic political cultures prefer limited 
government intervention, and Traditional political cultures believe the role of government is to maintain the status 
quo.   
xiv The effect of ownership on our alternative measures of quality (i.e., quality of life, quality of care, and other 
aspects of regulatory requirements) is also insignificant.  For further detail, see Appendix C.  
xv Examples of service areas where faith-based nonprofits are key service providers but there is less 
commercialization include programs targeting the homeless, prisoners, and welfare recipients. 
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Table 1. Independent Variables 
     
Variable Operational Definition, Measurement and Source 
Forprofit  Ownership (1=forprofit, 0=nonprofit and public).  Source:  Nursing Home Compare (NHC).  
Nonprofit  Ownership (1=nonprofit, 0=forprofit and public).  Source:  NHC.  
# residents Total number of residents in a facility.  The measure of facility size.  Source:  NHC. 
Organized 
groups 
Organized resident-led or family-led groups operating in the nursing home (1=yes, 0=no).  A 
measure of internal political influences.  Dummy variable (yes, no). Source:  NHC. 
Staffing 
Total nursing staff (registered nurses, vocational nurses, and nurse aids) per resident per day. 
Calculated based on Harrington, et al. (2000). A measure of human resources.  Source:  NHC.  
Note:  facilities with more than 12 total nurse hours were set to the maximum of 12 hours (CMS 
OSCAR data cleaning guidelines (HCFA, 2000)).  
Hospital 
affiliated 
Facility is hospital affiliated (1=yes, 0=no).  A measure of organizational network-affiliation vs. 
independence.  Source:  NHC. 
Chain 
affiliated 
Facility is chain affiliated (1=yes, 0=no).  A measure of organizational network-affiliation vs. 
independence.  Source:  NHC.  
Occupancy Occupancy (total number residents divided by the total number of beds).  A proxy measure of managerial efficiency and organizational revenues (resources).  Source: NHC. 
Market 
concentration 
index 
Market concentration (Herfindahl) index varies between zero and one; it is computed by obtaining 
the sum of squared market shares for all facilities in the county.  The measure of market 
competition vs. concentration.  Source:  NHC. 
% elderly Proportion of county population that is 65 years or older.  A control for demographics.  Source:  2000 U.S. Census.  http://www.census.gov  
Bush county 
Majority of county population voted for G.W. Bush =1 (versus A.Gore =0) during 2000 
Presidential Elections.  Dummy variable, proxy for political ideology.  A measure of state 
political/regulatory culture.  Source: David Leip's Online Atlas of Presidential Elections. 
http://www.uselectionatlas.org/  
Home health 
agencies 
Number of Home Health Agencies in the county (1999-2001).  A proxy measure of competition in 
the long term care market.  Source:  Area Resource Files.  
Poverty 
 
Proportion of population in poverty (county-level).  Source: Small Area Income and Poverty 
Estimates, Census, 1998-2000.  A control for community affluence and demand.   
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/saipe/index.html  
Religiosity 
County rate of adherents (all church members, including full members, their children and the 
estimated number of other participants who are not considered to be church members) to all 
religious denominations per 1000 population (2000).  Source:  Association of Religious Data 
Archives.  http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/RCMSCY.asp  
Final census 
response rates 
Percentage of county census responses received by mail, telephone or over the Internet through 
September 7 2000.  A measure of social capital.  Source:  2000 U.S. Census.  
http://www.census.gov  
Certificate of 
Need  
Certificate of Need/Bed Construction Moratorium (1999, state-level) (1=yes, 0=no).  A measure of 
regulatory influence. Source:  HCIA&Arthur Andersen, The Guide to Nursing Home Industry, 
2000.  
Moralistic 
state Moralistic state (1=yes, 0=no). Elazar’s Political Culture categorization (Mead 2004).   
Individualistic 
state Individualistic state (1=yes, 0=no).  Elazar’s Political Culture categorization (Mead 2004).   
Total Waiver 
Expenditures 
1915(c) HCBS Total Waiver Expenditures per participant.  A measure of government spending on 
elderly and disabled.  Source:  University of California Center for Personal Assistance Services 
Online: http://www.pascenter.org/state_based_stats/pick_a_state.php?url=http% 
3A%2F%2Fwww.pascenter.org%2Fstate_based_stats%2Fmedicaid_waiver. php&title%20=   
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Quality   
Total Number of Violations (0~188)        4.544      4.512 
Quality of Care 3.006 3.035 
Quality of Life 1.268 1.673 
Other 0.267 0.615 
Access    
% of Medicaid recipients in a facility          49.323        28.906 
% of county Medicaid recipients          15.025        23.277 
Ownership     
Faith-based ownership            0.203 0.402 
Facility Level    
Size (Number of residents)          86.063 71.804 
Organized resident group (1:Yes; 0: No)            0.887          0.316 
Staffing per resident            4.965          4.205 
Inside a Hospital (1: Yes; 0: No)            0.246          0.430 
Chain affiliation  (1:Yes; 0: No)            0.378          0.485 
Occupancy Rate          85.985        31.968 
County Level    
Market Concentration (Herfindahl Index, 0-1)            0.192          0.225 
% of elderly in the population          14.149          3.864 
Bush County  (1: Bush; 0: No)            0.554          0.497 
Number of Home Health Agencies            0.377          0.520 
Poverty Rate          10.889          4.469 
Religiosity (per 1000 population) 549.519 149.285 
Social capital (Census return rate) 68.791 7.374 
State Level    
Certificate of Need (1:Yes; 0: No)            0.790          0.407 
Moralist (1:Yes; 0: No)            0.347          0.476 
Individualist (1:Yes; 0: No)            0.442          0.496 
Total waiver expenditures per participant   20567   8474 
 
 
 44
Table 3. OLS Estimation Results of Quality and Access Models 
 
 Quality Model Access Model 
Dependent Variables Total Number of Violations 
% of Medicaid 
Recipients in a 
facility 
Share of county-
wide Medicaid 
Recipients 
Access 
 % of Medicaid Recipients in a facility 
 
0.027*** 
 
– – 
Quality    
Total Number of Violation – 0.703*** 0.146*** 
Faith Based Organization    
Yes 0.505 0.716 -2.434** 
Facility Level    
Size(Number of residents) 0.007*** 0.077*** 0.045*** 
Organized resident group 0.495** 21.776*** 2.188*** 
Staffing per resident 0.004 -0.913*** -0.165*** 
Inside a Hospital 0.274 -13.063*** -4.399*** 
Chain affiliation 0.288*** – –
Occupancy Rate – 0.0003 -0.003 
County Level    
Market Concentration  (Herfindahl Index) -0.096 19.156*** 93.278*** 
% of elderly in the population 0.026* -0.186** -0.015 
Bush County -0.564*** 2.564*** 0.060 
Number of Home Health Agencies 0.087 -0.265 1.012*** 
Poverty rate – 0.892*** -0.070** 
Religiosity -0.004*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 
Social capital (Census return rate) 0.015* -0.349*** -0.063*** 
State Level    
Certificate of Need -1.121*** 9.144*** -0.705** 
Moralist -0.054 4.120*** 1.983*** 
Individualist -1.470*** 2.997*** 0.977*** 
Total Waiver Expenditure -0.00002*** 0.0004*** -0.0001*** 
Year Dummies                
y2000 0.402 -7.469*** -1.422** 
y2001 0.262 -7.981*** -1.466** 
y2002 0.169 -7.710*** -1.658*** 
y2003 0.178 -7.698*** -1.267** 
Interactions    
FaithBased*Size -0.002 -0.005 0.013*** 
FaithBased*Concentration -0.142 -4.547 -4.931*** 
FaithBased*Religiosity -0.0008 -0.003 0.004* 
Intercept 4.790*** 24.996*** -1.768 
R2 0.096 0.424 0.838 
Note: *** P<0.001; ** P<0.01; * P<0.05;  N= 11,877. The reported effects of the slopes are not standardized.    
 
 
